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Abstract
This paper is devoted to the game theoretic analysis of decision situations,
in which the players have veto power over the actions undertaken by certain
other players. We give a full characterizatïon of the dividends ïn these games
with a perwnission structure. We find that the collection of these games forms
a subspace of the vector space of all games with side payments on a specified
player set.
Two applications of these results are provided. The first one deals with the
projection of additive games on a permission structure. It is shown that the
Shapley value of these projected games can be interpreted as an index that
measures the power of the agents in the permission structure. The second ap-
plication applies the derived results on games, where the organization structure
can be analysed separately from the production capacities of the participating
players.
1 Introduction
Recently, some authors have addressed the game theoretic analysis of (economic)
decision processes in which one imposes asymmetric constraints on the behaviour
of the decision takers. Several studies have enriched the game theoretic analysis of
the consequences of adopting this type of constraints on economic behaviour. We
mention the theory of cooperative games with arbitrary communication structures
as described in e.g. Myerson (1977 and 1980), Owen (1986), Aumann and Myerson
(1988) and Borm et al. (1990).
In this paper we introduce another type of asymmetry between players in a
cooperative game with side payments. We describe an organization in which each
player has veto power over the activities as performed by a specified collection of
players. So, all players in the game are dominating a- possibly empty - collection
of other players in the sense that they have veto power over the actions undertaken
by these players.
To illustrate this type of asymmetry between players we discuss an example.
Remind that a cooperative game with transfenable uttilities, or simply a TU-game, is
a pair (N, v), where N- {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players and v: 2N -~ R is a
characteristic function, which assigns to every coalition E C N an achievable payoff
v(E) such that v(~) - 0.
We consider the interaction between a potential seller and two potential buyers
of some object by the use of a TU-game. The seller values the object at ten dollars,2
the first buyer values it at twenty dollars, and the second buyer values it at thirty
dollars. Following Roth (1988) this situation can be modelled as a TU-game (N, v)
with N-{1,2,3} and v given by v(0) - 0, v(1) - 10, v(2) - v(3) - O,v(12) - 20,
v(13) - 30, v(23) - 0, and v(N) - 30. Applying the Shapley value, developed in
Shapley (1953), as the appropriate standard in dividing these potential payoffs we
derive that ~pi(v) - 213, ~pz(v) - 13, and ~p3(v) - 63.
Next we introduce the additional information that the seller, player 1, only has
the right to use the object, but that the property rights are in the hands of the first
buyer, player 2. This implies that the seller has to get permission from the first buyer
with respect to the sale of the object.' Instead of the game (N, v) as described above,
we have to describe the new situation with the use of a modified game (N, w), where
w is given by w(~) - w(1) - w(2) - w(3) - 0, w(12) - 20, w(13) - w(23) - 0,
and w(N) - 30. In this modification we take account of the fact that player 2 has to
be member of any payoff generating coalition. Again applying the Shapley value as
the appropriate standard in dividing the payoffs gives us cpl(w) - ~p2(w) - 133 and
~Pa(w) - 33'
The example above describes the consequences of the separation between prop-
erty rights and user rights. It is our purpose to separate the (potential) individual
abilities as described by the game from the behaviouristic rules or the organization
structure such as the separation of property rights from user rights. From the exam-
ple we conclude that constraints imposed by an organization structure may influence
payoffs considerably. This is the topic of this paper as well as the work by van den
Brink and Gilles (1991) and Gilles and Owen (1991).
We refer to the interpretation of the dominance structure as considered in the exam-
ple, in which a player has to get permission from all her superiors to pursue a certain
goal, as the Conjunetive approach.t By assumption we exclude the possibility that
players mutually have veto power over their actions.
The main part of this paper is devoted to the analysis of cooperative games
with side payments in which the playcrs are organized in a permission structure.
as dcscribed above. In our analysis we subscyucnLly introduc~c such ganx,s wi1J~
'In other words, this means that player 2 can veto the sale of the object.
1Gillea and Owen (1991) analyse the conaequences of another interpretation of the dominance
structure within a hierarchical organization. In this Disjanctive approacA it is asaumed that every
player has to get permission from at teast one of her superiors.-3-
permission structure and then apply the Conjunctive approach to give a description
of the possibilities of the players in such a situation. We then modify the game
accordingly. Our main result states that the collection of these modified TU-games is
generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those on coalitions, which
contain precisely all the players who have to give their permission to the actions of its
members. These coalitions are called autonomous in the permission structure. With
the use of this result we can give a description of the dividends of all coalitions in
such games with permission structure.
Finally we discuss two applications of games with permission structure. The
first application deals with additive games restricted to a permission structure. The
Shapley value of such a restricted garne can be interpreted as an index describing the
(positional or social) power of the players in the permission structure. Our analysis
shows that this provides an alternative for the power indices as developed by van den
Brink and Gilles (1990). The power indices as described in that paper are based on
a heuristic approach to social power in hierarchies, while the power indices resulting
from restrictions of additive games to permission structures are essentially based on
a game theoretic approach to social power.
The second application deals with an economic production situation, in which
the productive players form the lowest level in an organization as described by a
hierarchical permission structure. The managers in the higher levels are assumed to
be unproductive, but are necessary for the organization of these productive players
in productive units. We show that the managers can claim at least the average value
of the productive players, whom they dominate.
An axiomatic approach to the Shapley value for games with permission struc-
ture is given by van den Brink and Gilles (1991).
2 Games with permission structures
This section is devoted to an exposition and analysis of permission structures on sets
of players. Before we are able to introduce the main instrument in the description and
analysis of these permission structures, we have to make some notational conventions.
Firstly we denote by N:- { 1, 2, 3, ...} the set of all natural numbers. Similarly we
denote by R the set of all real numbers. If X is some finite set, then we denote by
~X its cardinality. By GN we denote the collection of all characteristic functions v-4-
on the finite player set N, representing a TU-game (N, v). It is obvious that ~N is a
(2" - 1)-dimensional real vector space, where n-~N.
A formal description of a domination structure on an arbitrary collection of
players N is developed in the next definition.
Definition 2.1 A permission structure on a finàte playerset .N is a mapping
S: N-~ 2N, which is asymmetric, i.e., for every pair i, j E N
j E S(i) implies that i~ S(j).
The collection of all permission structures on N is denoted as SN.
We remark that asymmetry of the permission structure S implies that it also satisfies
irreflexity, i.e., for every player i E N it holds that i~ S(i). The players j E S(i) are
called the successors of i. In our setting a player i E N is assumed to dominate his
successors j E S(i), in which the notion of "domination" will formally be specified in
the next section.
For every permission structure S E SN we can define a binary relation RS C
N x N given by
RS :- {(i, j) ~ i E N and j E S(i)}.
It is clear that RS is an asymmetric and irreflexive relation on N and describes the
dominance relations induced by the permission structure S on N.
Let S E SN be a permission structure and RS the belonging binary relation.
Now we denote by tr(RS) the transitive closure of RS.~ We introduce the mappiiig
S: N --~ 2N by
S(i) :- {j E N ~(i, j) E tr(Rs)},
assigning to every player i E N her suóordinates. Similarly we denote by
S-i(i) :- {j E N ~(j,i) E tr(RS)}
the collection of the superiors of player i E N in the permission structure R on N.
For every coalition E C N we define S(E) :- U;EES(i). Analogously for every
coalition E C N we define the collections S(E), and S-1(E).
With the use of the concept of a permission structure as introclua.d al~ove w~.
define a game with permission structure.
~The transitive dosure tr(R) of some binary relation R C N x N is given by (i, j) E tr(R) if and
only if there exists a sequence {h~,...,h,,,} C N with hl - i, (hk,hk~i) E R for 1 G k C m- 1,
andh,,,-j. - --5
Definition 2.2 A game with permission structure is a triple (N, v, S), where
N is a finite set of players, v E r~N is a cooper~ative game with side payments on N,
and S E SN is a permission structure on N.
It is clear that the collection of all games with permíssion structure on a playerset N
is precisely the collection ~N x SN.
3 The Conjunctive approach
If (N, v, S) is a game with permission structure, then we can interpret the situation
described as follows. Essentially, we can think of v E~N as representing the economic
possibilities open to every coalition in N. Thus v(E) represents the amount of utility,
which coalition E C N could normally obtain were it not for the permission structure
as imposed on the game. In the sequel we explicitly assume that the members of E
cannot act without permission from all their predecessors. More precisely, if any
i E E belongs to S(N ` E), then she cannot act without permission of at least one
player, who is not in E, and is therefore "lost" or "unproductive" to the coalition.~
In this case coalition E can only count on the, cooperation of those i E E, who do nol
require outside permission for their acts. We refer to the interpretation as described
above as the Conjunctive approach to games with permission structure. We remark
that other interpretations are also possible, as is shown in Gilles and Owen (1991).
The reasoning as followed above leads to the introduction of a class of coalitions
that are able to act without permission from players outside that coalition.
Definition 3.1 Let S E SN be a permission structure on N. The coalition E C N
is autonomous in S if
EnS(N~E)-0.
The collection of all autonomous coalitions in the permission structure S is denoted
by ~s-
According the Conjunctive approach the autonomous coalitions are essentially the
only payoff generating coalitions within a game with permission structure. The proof
of the following lemma is obvious.
SIn the sale of an object as described in the introduction this is the case with player 1. He has
to get permission from the property rights owner, player 2, before he is able to sell or execute the
user rights.6
Lemma 3.2 Let S E SN be a permission structure on N and let E C N be some
coalition. Then E is autonomous if and only if S-1(E) C E.
Lemma 3.2 shows explicitly that indeed all superiors of the players in ar. autonomous
coalition are also member of that coalition. With respect to the collection ~s of all
autonomous coalitions we can say the following.
Proposition 3.3 Get S E S`v be a permission structure on N. Then the collection
~s of autonomous coalitáons satisfies the following properties:
(i) ~ E ~s.
(ii) N E ~s.
(iii) For all E, F E ~s it holds that E U F E ~s and E fl F E~s.
PROOF
By Lemma 3.2 E E~s means that S-I(i) C E for every i E E. It follows that
OE~s(asnoiEl~)andNE~s(asS-i(i)CNforallíEN).
If E, F E ~s and i E E U F, then either i E E or i E F. If i E E, then S-' (i) C E C
E U F. Similarly, this holds for i E F, and hence E U F E~s.
If E, F E~s and i E E(1 F, then i E E as well as i E F. Thus, S-1(i) C E as well
as S-1(i) C F, and so S-'(i) C E fl F. Thus, E fl F E~s.
Q.E.D.
From the properties as mentioned in Proposition 3.3 it immediately follows that
for any coalition E C N there exists a largest autonomous subset and a smallest
autonomous superset. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3.4 Let S E SN and let E C N. The sovereign part of E in S is the
set
Q(E) :- U{F ~ F C E, F E ~s}.
The authorizing set of E in S is given by
a(E) :- n{F ~ E C F, F E~s}.-7-
In the framework oí the Conjunctive approach it is clear that a coalition E C N can
maximally obtain the payoff generated by íts sovereign part o(E). On the other hand
the authorizing set a(E) of E is precisely the smallest coalition, which contains all
members of E as well as their superiors. Hence, the authorizing set is the srnallest,
coalition containing E, which can act autonomously.
Lemma 3.5 Let S E SN and F, C N. Then the jollowing properties hold:
(a) o(E) - E ~ S(N ~ E).
(b) a(E) - E U S-r(E).
The proof of the lemma is left to the reader.
Example 3.6 Consider the player set N- { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the permission struc-
ture S: N--~ 2N given by
S(1) - {2,3,4}, S(2) - {4}, S(3) - {5}, S(4) - {6}, S(5) - 0, S(6) - 0.
This structure can be represented by the following directed graph.
Take E-{1,4,6}, then S(N `E) -{4,5}. Clearly, since E fl S(N `E) -{4} ~ 0,
the coalition E is not autonomous. As S(N `E) -{4, 5, 6}, the sovereign part of E
is given by o(E) - E`S(N `E) -{1}. Furthermore, the authorizing set of E is
just a(E) - {1, 2, 4, 6}.
To complete the introductory analysis of the concepts of the sovereign part and the
authorizing set of a coalition we prove the following properties.
Proposition 3.7 Let E, F C N be two coalitions. Then
(i) Q(E) U a(F) C a(E U F).-8-
(ii) a(E) n v(F) - Q(E n F).
(iii) a(E) U a(F) - a(E U F).
(iv) ee(E n F) C a(E) n a(F).
PROOF
From the definition we derive that for every E C N
o(E) -{i E E ~ S-1(i) C E}.
Using this equality we prove the assertions of the proposition.
(i) Let i E Q(E) U a(F). Then S-1(i) C E or S-1(i
(E U F) and the assertion follows by definition.
) C F. Hence, S-~ (i) C
(ii) Clearly i E a(E n F) iff S-1(i) E E n F. This is equivalent to the statement
that i E a(E) as well as i E Q(F).
(iii) The assertion easily follows from the following equation:
a(EUF) - U S-1(i)UEUF
~EEuF
U S-'(i) U U S-1(j) U E U F
iEE jEF
- a(E) U c~(F).
(iv) For i E a(E n F) it either holds that i E E n F or there is some j E E n F
such that j E S(i).
If i E E n F, then surely i E~(E) as well as i E a(F), i.e., i E a(E) n cY(F).
If there is some j E E n F with j E S(i), then by the fact that j E E as well
as j E F it is evident that i E c~(E) as well as i E a(F).
Q.E.D.-9
4 Conjunctive restrictions
In the definition of a game with permission structure (N, v, S) we introduced the po-
tential payoffs, represented by the game v E t~`v, independently from the permission
structure S E SN. Based on the Conjunctive approach, in this section we transform
a game with permission structure into a single TU-game, which describes all possi-
bilities open to the players in the permission structure S, given their potentials as
described by the game v. The resulting TU-game is called the Conjunetive restrictior~
of v on permission structure S.
For that purpose we introduce for an arbitrary permission structure S E SN
the following collection of TU-games:
C~(N, S) :- {v E~N ~ v(E) - v(~(E)), for all E C N}.
The Conjunctive restriction of a game v on a permission structure S is now simply
defined as the projection of v on the set C(N, S) in the real vector space CN:
Definition 4.1 Let v E~N and let S E SN. The game w E ~(N, S) is the Con-
junetive restriction of v on S if it satisfies the property that for every coalition
ECN
w(E) - v (o(E)) .
Definition 4.I introduces a mapping 1ZS: ~N ~~(N, S), which assigns to every game
v E GN its (Conjunctive) restriction RS(v) - w E ~(N, S). It is evident that 7ZS is a
linear mapping on CN. To study its properties we consider two alternative bases for
the (2n - 1)-dimensional real vector space CJN.
The standard basis oí C~N is given by the games {zE ~ E C N, E~ 0} defined
by
zE(F,) I if E- F
- 0 if E~F
It is easy to see that in terms of the standard basis the game v E~N can be expressed
as
v - ~ v(E) . zE. (1)
ECN
E~e
The unanimity basis of C~N consists of the games {uE ~ E C N, E~ 0} given by10-
uE(F,) - J 1 if E C F
l 0 otherwise
Following Harsanyi (1959) the game v E C~N can be expressed as
v - ~ ~v(E) ' uE, (2)
EC N
E~e
where the quantity 0„(E) is referred to as the dividend of coalition E in game v. For
every E C N this dividend is given by
Ov(E) .- ~ (-I)~E-~FV(F)-
FCE
(3)
We remark that for every coalition E C N its worth v(E) and its dividend ~„(E)
are related by both ( 3) and the equivalent system
v(E) - ~ 0„(F).
FCE
To analyze the projection mapping RS properly, we study its behaviour on the col-
lection of all unanimity garnes uE, where E C N, E~ 0.
Theorem 4.2 Let E C N, E~~, be any coalition. Then
~S(uE) - ~a(E).
PROOF
Let F- a(E) and w- 7ZS(uE). By Lemma 3.5 F is an autonomous coalition, i.e.,
o(F) - F. Furthermore, let G C N be any (non-empty) coalition.
First we look at the case that F C G. Then E C F- a(F) C Q(G), and so
w(G) - uE (Q(G)) - 1.
Next suppose that F is not a subset of G, i.e., F`G ~ 0. Then there exists a player
j E F with j~ G. Since j E F we have either that j E E or j E S-'(E).
If j E E, then E`G ~ 0 and thus E`o(G) ~ 0.
If j E S-'(E), then there is some player i E E with i E S(j). As j ~ G, this
means that i E S(N `G), and so i ~ a(G). Again we arrive at the conclusion that
E `a(G) ~ 0.
In either case we may conclude that-11-
w(G) - uE (o-(G)) - 0.
This implies that
w(G) -~
1 if a(E) C C
0 otherwise
and so w - uá(E).
Q.E.D.
With the use of the unanimity basis of GN and the belonging dividends we now can
express the linear mapping ~Zs.
Corollary 4.3 Let v E~N be any garae. Then
~S(v) - ~ ~ 0„(E) . uF.
FE~s EcN
a(E)-F
This gives the desired expression for the Conjunctive restriction belonging to an
arbitrary game with permission structure. In the next section this expression is used
frequently to analyze games with a permission structure.
The second main result adresses the properties of the mapping RS as a projection
mapping in the space of all TU-games GN.
Theorem 4.4 The linear mapping Rs is a projection mapping of rank A on C~N,
where A- ~~S - 1 is the number of non-empty autonomous subsets in S. Its kernel
is genenated 6y the games {zE ~ E~~s}. Its image is genemted by the unanimity
games {uE ~ E E ~s}.
PROOF
Suppose that the coalition E C N is not autonomous. Let zE be the standard basis
game belonging to E and let w- 7Z5(zE) be the restriction of zE on S.
Now there is no coalition F such that E- Q(F). Thus for any coalition F C N
w(F) - zE(v(F)) - 0.-12
We may conclude that w is the null game and so zE E Kernel (Rs).
Now suppose that E C N, E~(D, is an autonomous coalition. By Theorem 4.2 it
holds that Rs(uE) - uplEl. With E- a(F,) it immediately follows that Rs(uE) -
uE, and hence that uE E Image (Rs).
Now the 2" - 1- A games zE, E not autonomous, all belong to the kernel of Rs.
5ince these games are all linearly independent, the dimension of the kernel of 1Zs
must be at least 2" - 1- A.
On the other hand, the A games uE, with E autonomous, all belong to the image of
Rs. These are also all linearly independent, and so the dimension of the image of
Rs is at least A.
But t,he sum of these dimensions must be exactly 2" - 1. Thus
dim (Kernel (R.s)) - 2n - 1- A, and
dim(Image(1Zs)) - A.
The given sets of games clearly form bases for the kernel respectively the image of
the linear mapping 1Zs.




Hence, from Theorem 4.2 it immediately follows that 7Zs(v) - v.
Q.E.D.
Based on the theorems as derived above and the properties as given in Proposition 3.7
we are able to prove some additional properties of the mapping RS:CN ~ C ~(N, S).
Before stating these properties we recall some well known game theoretic concepts.
Definition 4.5 Let v E ~N be a TU-game.
(a) v is monotone iJ Jor all coalitions E, F C N with E C F it holds that
v(E) C v(F).
(b) v is superadditive iffor all coalitions E, F C N with Efl F -~ it holds that-13-
v(E U F) ~ v(E) ~ v(F).
(c) v ás convex áfjor all coalitions E, F C N it holds that
v(E u F) f v(E n F) ~ v(E) f v(F).
(d) v is balanced if the Core of that game ás not empty, i.e., there exists a
function x: N--r R such that for every coalition E C N: x(E) :- ~;EE x; 1
v(E) and x(N) - v(N).
The next result states that most of the above properties are invariant with respect
to taking the conjunctive restriction of a game on a permission structure.
Theorem 4.6 Let S E SN be any permission structure.
(r) If v E ~N is monotone, then its Conjunctive restriction RS(v) is monotone
also. Moreover, if v is balanced, then Rs(v) is balanced also.
(ii) For every superadditive game v E CjN its Conjunctive restriction RS(v) is
superadditive also.
(iii) If v E~N is convex, then its Conjunetive restriction RS(v) is convex also.
(iv) If S is such that there exists a player io E N with S(io) - N`{io}, then the
Conjunctáve restriction7Zs(v) of any monotone game v E GN ás superaddátáve
and balanced.
PROOF
Take an arbitrary game v E~N and let w :- 7ZS(v) be its Conjunctive restriction.
(i) Suppose v is rnonotonc. Take F, C ~'' and let C:- F` l;. 'I'hi~n
w(F) - v(~(F)) - v(a(E U G)) ~ v(a(F.) U a(G)) ~ v(Q(E)) - w(H').
Suppose that v is balanced as well as monotone and let x be a Core impu-
tation, i.e., x(N) - v(N) and for every E C N: x(E) ~ v(E). Then by
monotonicity for every E C N it holds that v(E) 7 v(o-(E)) - w(E), and
hence x(E) ~ v(E) ) w(E). Thus, x is a Core imputation of w also.-14-
(ii) Suppose v is superadditive. Take E, F C N such that E fl F- 0. Then
v(a(E U F)) 1 v(a(E) U a(F)) ~ v(v(E)) f v(Q(F')).
(iii) Suppose v is convex. Without loss of generality we may assume that v(E) ? 0
for all coalitions E C N. Now take E, F C N. Then
w(E U F) - v(a(E U F)) - v(a(E) U a(F) U H),
where H- o(E U F) ~[v(E) U a(F)]. Since H fl Q(E) - H fl v(F) - (~ it
follows by convexity of v that
v(Q(E U F)) ~ v(o(E) U o(F)) -F v(H) ~ v(Q(E) U v(F)).
Hence, with (ii) of Proposition 3.7,
w(E U F) .{- w(E fl F) - v(~(E U F)) f v(a(E fl F))
) v(a(E) U o(F)) ~- v(o(E) fl a(F))
1 v(v(E)) f v(v(F)) - w(E) -f w(F).
(iv) Suppose that v is monotone. Since for every coalition E C N it holds that
v(N) ~ v(E) as well as v(N) - w(N) ~ w(E) and for every coalition
F C N`{io} w(F) - 0 it follows immediately that the imputation x with
x;a - v(N) and x~ - 0, j~ io is in the Core of w.
To show superadditivity take E, F C N with E(1 F- 0. From the property
of S it is clear that either a(E) -~ or Q(F) - la or a(E) - o(F) -~. Thus,
we only have to establish that in case v(E) ~~ and Q(F) - 1~ it holds that
w(E U F) - v(o(E U F)) ~
1 v(Q(E)) - v(Q(E)) ~ v(~(F)) - w(E) ~- w(F).
Q.E.U.5 Some applications
This section is devoted to two applícations oí our analysis of games with a permis-
sion structure. The first application discusses the collection of additive games and
their restrictions to an acyclic permission structure. In this example we also derive
an expression for the Shapley value of such a restriction. In this case the Shapley
value gives a representation of the (weighted) hierarchical power of a player in the
permission structure of the garne. In the second application we discuss a specified
class of games on a given hierarchical permission structure S E S~`, namely those of
which the payoff generating players are in the lowest echelon or level in the híerarchy.
5.1 Additive games with permission structure
The valuation of a position in a permission structure depends, of course, on the
abilities of the individual members, which are above and below that position. These
abilities are represented by the original, unrestricted game v E~N. By taking certain
"standard~ games for v, we can obtain insights into the "value" of a position in the
structure as described by S E SN. This analysis has to be performed with respect to
the Conjunctive restriction RS(v) of the original game v.
In this subsection we restrict ourselves to the analysis of acyclic permission
structures with the use of additive games. A permission S E SN is acyclic if for every
player i E N it holds that i~ S(i). Let .~ :- (~1i ...,~„) E R~~ be a strictly positive
vector of weights. Next we introduce the game va E GN as the additive game with
weight vector a given by
va(E) :- ~ a;, E C N.
iEE
Thus, it is assumed that the (original) individual abilities of player i E N are repre-
sented by the weight ~; ~ 0. Since the player i E N lias to give permission to her
subordinates j E S(i), she can evidently claim a part of the payoff generated by these
subordinates. This is exactly what is described by the restricted game ~ZS(va). By an-
alyzing these restricted games, we analyze the power structure within the permission
structure.
It is obvious that for every coalition F. C N it holds that
Qv~(E) .~; if E- {i} for some i E N
- 0 otherwise-16-
Let wa :- 1ZS(va). Then by Corollary 4.3 we can derive that for every coalition
ECN, E~O,
~wa(E) - ~ ~i~ (4)
iEN
n({i})-E
By definition of the authorizing set of a coalition and the acyclicity of S it is obvious
that for all players i, j E N with i~ j it is not possible that i E S(j) as well as
j E S(i). This implies that for all i~ j: a({i}) ~~({j}). From this we conclude
that
Qw~(E) ~; if E- cr({i}) for some i E N
- 0 otherwise
The next step in our analysis is to give a complete description of the Shapley value
of w~. A well known formula for the Shapley value, applied to the game wa is given
by
~~~E), i E N. ~Pi(wa) - ~
ECN
iEE
Hence, substituting (4) in (5) yields for every player i E N
nj í`; ~j
~i(wa) - ~ Q(j) ~- i - a(i) -~ i ~;~;1 a(j) -t- i'
iEa({j})
(5)
where Q(j) :- ~S-1(j) for every j E N.
This expression of the Shapley value of the restriction of the additive game
va is clearly an index that measures the hierarchical power of players in the (acyclic)
permission structure S. Taking the weights of the players into account this index
only depends upon the organization structure as represented by S. The weight of
some player i E N is equally spread over herself and her superiors.
Example 5.1 Consider the permission structure as given in Example 3.6. Clearly it
is acyclic. We immediately see that ~(1) - 0, Q(2) - 1, a(3) - 1, ~3(4) - 2, Q(5) - 2,
and Q(6) - 3. Now we assign to every player the unit weight, i.e., .~ -(1, ..., 1) E
Rt. The Shapley value of the Conjunctive restriction of the additive game va is given
by
`~(Rs(v~)) - 12 ~
(35,13,10, 7, 4, 3).-17-
Comparing this power index with the Shapley value of the original additive game va,
which is given by y~(va) -( 1, ...,1) E R~, we conclude that a substantial shift in
power has been resulting from the various positions of the players in the permission
structure S. The leader 1 E N clearly has gained a much higher payoff because of
his leadership.
5.2 Games with unproductive superiors
In this subsection we consider hierarchicalpermission structures and apply this con-
cept to analyze organizations in which the "productiven players are in the lowest level
in the hierarchy.
We define a permission structure S E SN to be hierarehical if it is acyclic and
for every pair i, j E N there exists a player h E N such that
{i, j} C [S(h) U {h}].
In van den Brink and Gilles ( 1990) it is shown that there exists a partition L~, ..., L,y
of N such that
L1 -{i E N ~ S(i) -~}, and
r k-1 k-1
Lk-{iEN`ULp~S(i)C ULp , 2ckcM.
t p-1 p-1
- -
Moreover, it can be shown that L,y consists of a singleton only. The sets Lk are called
the echelons or levels of the hierarchical permissíon structure S. Refering to Swamy
and Thulasiraman (1981) we note that the belonging binary relation RS describes an
acyclic quasi-strongly connected directed graph in case S is hierarchical.
Let E C N be some coalition. Then we indicate by
p(E) :- {i E E ~ S(i) n E- 0}
the collection of pending players in E. With the definition of echelons in the per-
mission structure S we derive that p(N) - L~. With the use of the notion of
pending players as defined above we can derive an alternative characterization of
an autonomous coalition.
Lemma 5.2 Let E C N and let F C E. Then E- a(F) if and only ij p(E) C F
and E - a(p(E)).-ls-
PROOF
If
Since p(E) C F it is clear that E- a(p(E)) C a(F) C a(E) - a(p(E)) - E.
Only if
Suppose by contradiction that there is a player i E p(E) such that i~ F. By
definition S(i) fl E-~. But E- a(F) implies that there exists a player j E F C E
with i E S-r(j), i.e., j E S(i). This is in contradiction with the supposition. Thus
we conclude that p(E) C F and furtherrnore E- a(E) - a(p(E)).
Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.3 E C N is an autonornous coalition if and only if E- a(p(E)).
With these notions and results we can restate the expressions for the dividends of
the Conjunctive restriction of a game in terms of the dividends of the original game
as derived in Section 4. Let v E GN and let w - RS(v). Then we derive that for all
E C N with E- a(p(E)):
Ow(E) - ~ 0„(F).
FCN
p(E)CF
This again can be rewritten as
Ow(E) - ~ 0„(F U P(E))-
FCS-'(p(E))
Now we turn to the description of a situation with unproductive superiors.
Let P- {1,...,p} and Q- {p-{-1,...,p-{-q}. Define N:- PUQ. (Hence, it
holds that n- p f q.l Now we take a hierarchical permission structure S E SN such
that
p(N) - Lr - Q. (6)
From (6) it follows that for every i E Q: S(i) - ~. Hence, the collection Q is the lowest
echelon in the hierarchy as described by the permission structure S. It is our purpose
to describe a situation in which the players in Q are (potentially) "productive", while
the players in P are (potentially) "unproductive". However, from their positions in
the hierarchy the unproductive players or managers in P can claim certain portions
of the payoffs generated by the productive players or workers in Q.
We construct such a game with permission structure as follows. Let u E GQ
be any game on the player set Q. Now we define the game v E~N by-19
v(E) :- u(E n Q), E c N.
It. is clear that (N, v, S) as constructed above indeed describes a situation with man-
agers i E P and workers i. E Q. The allocation of payoffs in this particular situation
can be analyzed with the use of the Shapley value of the Conjunctive restriction of v
on S.
Thus, we define w- RS(v) as the relevant description of the productive
situation. Now by the results as proved in Section 4 we derive that
~w(E) -~ 0„(E n Q) if E- c~(E n Q)
0 otherwise
We note that the requirement that E- cY(E n Q) is equivalent to the condition
that E- a(p(E)) and p(E) C Q. With use of this formulation we can analyze the
positions of the players in the production game w by means of the Shapley value.
For the productive workers in (N, v, S) we can deduce the following. Let i E Q,
then
E Du F
~p;(w) - ~ ~~É ) - ~ ~a(~,) .
ECN
iEE iE
Evidently, for every player i E F C Q it holds that ~~(F) ~~F f~S-'(i) -
j~F f ~3(i). Hence,
~F ~ ~F ~ g
~a(F) - ~F f Q(z) - 9 ~ Q(i)
This leads to the conclusion that for every i E Q
~~(w) ~ 4 f ~(T)
~~(u)
We remark that the bound is cxact if and only if i is the unique productive player in
the game w, i.e., Q- {i}.
We give a similar analysis for the "unproductive" managers in the collection
P. For every i E P define Q(i) :- {F C Q ~ F n S(i) ~ 0}. Then the expected
payoff, represented by the Shapley value, is for every i E P given by
0,.(F)
cp;(w) - ~ ~o(F,).
FEQ(~)
Therefore for i E P- by defining q; :- ~[Q n s(i)~ - it follows that-20-
1
cp;(w) 7 max ~Pi(iv) ~ - - ~ ~Pi(w).
iEQ~~) Qi
iEQ~1S(i)
Example 5.4 Again take the permission structure as described in Example 3.6. It
clearly is hierarchical. Take P:-N`L~ - { 1, 2, 3, 4} and Q :- Lr -{5, 6}. Now let
the game u E~Q be given by
u(~) - 0 ;
u({5}) - u({6}) - 1 ;
u(Q) - 5.
Evidently it holds that the dividends are given by
~„({5}) - 0„({6}) - 1 ;
0,.(Q) - 3.
As before define the game v E t~N as v(B) :- u(E (1 Q), for every E C N. Applying
the formulas as derived above we can cornpute that
1
~P(u~) - 12
- (13, 9, 10, 9,10, 9),
where w :- 1Zs(v) is the production game. This shows that the upper bound as given
above for players in Q inde.ed gives a good indication for the value, which is actually
reached. Moreover, it shows that the lowcr bound for certain players in P can be
exact.
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